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Judging from this bit of information I stumbled upon, it looks like the recapitalization program is going to keep HKWv's in use by the military for a long time to come. It makes since, as they do need a general purpose logistics truck that is unarmored, or lightly armored and air transportable. At over $100K a piece, it would take costs the pentagon way to much to outright replace all 200,000+ of them. Basically they will do what they did to the M35's ESL program....
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HMMWV Recapitalization
A large portion of the HMMWV fleet was built in the first 6 years of the program. The HMMWV was originally built with an expected service life of 15 years. In FY00 the first 3 trucks produced went over age and represented the beginning of a trend. These first trucks, along with those built in FY85, were the bow wave of a significant aging trend across the HMMWV fleet. The fleet average age was also increasing. At the end of FY01 the fleet average age was approximately 10.8 years old. At the time, funding levels were only for the acquisition of new vehicles, and so the HMMWV fleet average age had the potential to grow to almost 17 years old by FY10.
The US Army's Product Manager - Light Tactical Vehicles recognized the need to address the rapidly rising operation and support (O&S) costs associated with these over age vehicles and began to develop an OPA-funded program to rebuild and upgrade the fleet of over 100,000 vehicles. The program's initial objective was to return HMMWVs to a near zero hours/miles condition to extend their life for an additional 21 years. This would be done while also enhancing performance and minimizing O&S costs. As initially conceived, the program would have included a new engine and drive train, new corrosion-resistant frame rails and 50 other mandatory modernization parts. The cost of this modernization program was projected to approach $40K per vehicle.
The scope of this program expanded in 2000 with the advent of the Army Recapitalization Policy. The goal of this initiative was to enhance readiness and slow the growth of O&S costs by maintaining the average fleet age at or below half the system's expected service life. In support of this effort PM-LTV developed a mathematical model to predict the average fleet age and numbers of vehicles within service life or over age based on projected annual new production and recapitalization quantities. Using this model it was determined that over 8,000 vehicles had to be recapitalized annually for the first several years in order meet the half-life standard by the target date of 2010. The high cost of this and other recapitalization programs caused the Army to further refine the recapitalization standard.
In September 2001, the Army leadership determined that it was not cost effective to fully recapitalize the HMMWV fleet to a zero hour/zero mile standard. The program was redirected towards an OMA-funded, focused recapitalization effort of only the older vehicles in III Corps. The reduced scope of work consisted of an engine and drive train rebuild and a focused component inspect, repair and replace process. This program was approved by the VCSA on 19 October, 2001 and funding was programmed for the recapitalization of 4,372 total vehicles starting in FY04. The result of this focused recapitalization effort was to be a vehicle with a 10 year extended service life that is like new in appearance and performance.
The HMMWV Rrecapitalization rebuilt older HMMWV variants (initially M998 cargo/troop carriers and M1037 shelter carriers) into armor-capable M1097s. It reduced overall operations and support costs and increased the service life of the overall HMMWV fleet. It provided a platform for the spiralling of new technology into the HMMWV fleet. A centerpiece of the recapitalization effort was the Repower Initiative, which would spiral a new power train into both recapitalized and new production lines for more power, better reliability and sustainability, better range and fuel economy, and better environmental controls. The first recapitalized vehicles were delivered by the Red River Army Depot.
The recapitalization program eventually expanded to include M1038 and M1038A1 cargo/troop carriers and older M1097 and M1097 heavy cargo/shelter carriers. These would be similarly converted into an M1097R1 configuration in order to support increased payload, allowing for the addition of add-on armor. Additionally, M1025, M1025A1, M1026, and M1026A1 armament carriers were included in the program to undergo similar conversion, with the resulting standard designated M1025R1.
With inclusion of armor and increased operational demands on the vehicle, it became necessary to replace the existing powertrain package to regain vehicle performance and significantly improve reliability and maintainability. As a result, the HMMWV Repower Kit would be incorporated into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles. This effort repowered the M1097R1 vehicle with a new engine/drive train kit that included provisions for rapid removal and replacement of major components. The new powertrain package would be procured and delivered as a kit to US Army depots (Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas) for installation during the recapitalization process.
Additional funds were authorized in FY05. Also funded was the HMMWV Repower testing and Development to support logistics improvements to the HMMWV family through the use of improved engine technologies and maintainability improvements, which would result in decreased operational support costs and product improvements. The Acquisition Strategy for HMMWV Repower was to award 3 contracts for testing and logistical improvements, development and testing of vehicle prototypes.
Led by the Engines Team, testing began in October 2005 to provide information for engine and chassis selection. TARDEC tested the selected engines on dynamometers in test cells and the vehicles for full load cooling either at Aberdeen or Yuma Proving Grounds.
To fulfill the need for the integration of HMMWV Repower Kits into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles, TACOM developed a streamlined acquisition strategy consisting of 2 phases. The acquisition strategy was to award a single production contract to support Phase II of the HMMWV Repower Program. The Phase II proposed Repower Kit, as installed in Recap Vehicles, was required to meet all Phase II threshold contract requirements. In responding to Phase I test failures in the Phase II proposal, proposing a change in the contract requirements was not acceptable. The degree to which the Phase II proposed credible corrective actions resulted in major redesigns or major modifications would significantly increase risk. A major modification to the Repower kit was a change to a component which potentially resulted from a major or catastrophic TIR and/or was determined by the Test Community to be so significant, that if changed it would result in the need to accumulate additional RAM test miles in order to validate the proposed kit fix. Additionally, a modification would be classified major if it resulted in a 10 percent cost increase to the Repower Kit. If corrective plans were not credibly supported or if the proposed fix was simply technically unacceptable, this could have resulted in the failed condition being determined a deficiency, which might have prevented award of a contract.
Under Phase I, TACOM awarded 3 contracts for the integration of the respective contractors HMMWV Repower Kit into a HMMWV Recapitalized vehicle, purchased 8 each, HMMWV Repower Kits per contract (this was broken down in one kit integrated into a HMMWV Recapped vehicle and 7 kits installed at Letterkenny Army Depot), acquired Field Service Representative support during installation of the kits, and acquired field service test support at up to 3 Government test sites (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Yuma Proving Ground, and TACOM).
Four of the vehicles (with the furnished Repower Kits installed) were sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Maryland, and 3 of the vehicles, with the kit installed, were sent to Yuma Proving Grounds, Yuma, Arizona, for testing. The purpose of testing was to both run tests to support a Materiel Release/Type Classification Decision following award of the production contract (Phase II) and to provide data from testing for the Phase II source selection decision. Vehicles provided for this test were to be as close to production vehicles as possible. Contractors whose Phase I product differed significantly from what they proposed for production under the Phase II Evaluation would be downgraded in their assessment to the extent any untested Phase II configuration changes posed a heightened risk to the Government.
As of 2005 the Marine Corps had an inventory of about 20,000 Humvees, while the Army had more than 120,000. The projected life cyle of an HMMWV at the time was 13 years, but they last no more than 2 in Iraq. The high operational tempo in Iraq led to the determination that 30 days of sustained operations there equated to a full year of operations under the conditions used to project the vehicle's initial life cycle. This meant some of the vehicles had reached an age of 13.9 years by the end of 2004.
By February 2009, the HMMWV Recapitalization program was averaging 800 vehicles converted per month. To that date, the Red River Army Depot had converted 16,745 vehicles, the Letterkenny Army Depot had converted 14,058, and the Maine Military Authority had converted 1210. The program at the time had funding through July 2009. A plan was also in place to look into converting initial up-armored HMMWVs (M1114/M1116 and similar types) to a configuration similar to the M1151.
------------------
HMMWV Recapitalization
A large portion of the HMMWV fleet was built in the first 6 years of the program. The HMMWV was originally built with an expected service life of 15 years. In FY00 the first 3 trucks produced went over age and represented the beginning of a trend. These first trucks, along with those built in FY85, were the bow wave of a significant aging trend across the HMMWV fleet. The fleet average age was also increasing. At the end of FY01 the fleet average age was approximately 10.8 years old. At the time, funding levels were only for the acquisition of new vehicles, and so the HMMWV fleet average age had the potential to grow to almost 17 years old by FY10.
The US Army's Product Manager - Light Tactical Vehicles recognized the need to address the rapidly rising operation and support (O&S) costs associated with these over age vehicles and began to develop an OPA-funded program to rebuild and upgrade the fleet of over 100,000 vehicles. The program's initial objective was to return HMMWVs to a near zero hours/miles condition to extend their life for an additional 21 years. This would be done while also enhancing performance and minimizing O&S costs. As initially conceived, the program would have included a new engine and drive train, new corrosion-resistant frame rails and 50 other mandatory modernization parts. The cost of this modernization program was projected to approach $40K per vehicle.
The scope of this program expanded in 2000 with the advent of the Army Recapitalization Policy. The goal of this initiative was to enhance readiness and slow the growth of O&S costs by maintaining the average fleet age at or below half the system's expected service life. In support of this effort PM-LTV developed a mathematical model to predict the average fleet age and numbers of vehicles within service life or over age based on projected annual new production and recapitalization quantities. Using this model it was determined that over 8,000 vehicles had to be recapitalized annually for the first several years in order meet the half-life standard by the target date of 2010. The high cost of this and other recapitalization programs caused the Army to further refine the recapitalization standard.
In September 2001, the Army leadership determined that it was not cost effective to fully recapitalize the HMMWV fleet to a zero hour/zero mile standard. The program was redirected towards an OMA-funded, focused recapitalization effort of only the older vehicles in III Corps. The reduced scope of work consisted of an engine and drive train rebuild and a focused component inspect, repair and replace process. This program was approved by the VCSA on 19 October, 2001 and funding was programmed for the recapitalization of 4,372 total vehicles starting in FY04. The result of this focused recapitalization effort was to be a vehicle with a 10 year extended service life that is like new in appearance and performance.
The HMMWV Rrecapitalization rebuilt older HMMWV variants (initially M998 cargo/troop carriers and M1037 shelter carriers) into armor-capable M1097s. It reduced overall operations and support costs and increased the service life of the overall HMMWV fleet. It provided a platform for the spiralling of new technology into the HMMWV fleet. A centerpiece of the recapitalization effort was the Repower Initiative, which would spiral a new power train into both recapitalized and new production lines for more power, better reliability and sustainability, better range and fuel economy, and better environmental controls. The first recapitalized vehicles were delivered by the Red River Army Depot.
The recapitalization program eventually expanded to include M1038 and M1038A1 cargo/troop carriers and older M1097 and M1097 heavy cargo/shelter carriers. These would be similarly converted into an M1097R1 configuration in order to support increased payload, allowing for the addition of add-on armor. Additionally, M1025, M1025A1, M1026, and M1026A1 armament carriers were included in the program to undergo similar conversion, with the resulting standard designated M1025R1.
With inclusion of armor and increased operational demands on the vehicle, it became necessary to replace the existing powertrain package to regain vehicle performance and significantly improve reliability and maintainability. As a result, the HMMWV Repower Kit would be incorporated into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles. This effort repowered the M1097R1 vehicle with a new engine/drive train kit that included provisions for rapid removal and replacement of major components. The new powertrain package would be procured and delivered as a kit to US Army depots (Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas) for installation during the recapitalization process.
Additional funds were authorized in FY05. Also funded was the HMMWV Repower testing and Development to support logistics improvements to the HMMWV family through the use of improved engine technologies and maintainability improvements, which would result in decreased operational support costs and product improvements. The Acquisition Strategy for HMMWV Repower was to award 3 contracts for testing and logistical improvements, development and testing of vehicle prototypes.
Led by the Engines Team, testing began in October 2005 to provide information for engine and chassis selection. TARDEC tested the selected engines on dynamometers in test cells and the vehicles for full load cooling either at Aberdeen or Yuma Proving Grounds.
To fulfill the need for the integration of HMMWV Repower Kits into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles, TACOM developed a streamlined acquisition strategy consisting of 2 phases. The acquisition strategy was to award a single production contract to support Phase II of the HMMWV Repower Program. The Phase II proposed Repower Kit, as installed in Recap Vehicles, was required to meet all Phase II threshold contract requirements. In responding to Phase I test failures in the Phase II proposal, proposing a change in the contract requirements was not acceptable. The degree to which the Phase II proposed credible corrective actions resulted in major redesigns or major modifications would significantly increase risk. A major modification to the Repower kit was a change to a component which potentially resulted from a major or catastrophic TIR and/or was determined by the Test Community to be so significant, that if changed it would result in the need to accumulate additional RAM test miles in order to validate the proposed kit fix. Additionally, a modification would be classified major if it resulted in a 10 percent cost increase to the Repower Kit. If corrective plans were not credibly supported or if the proposed fix was simply technically unacceptable, this could have resulted in the failed condition being determined a deficiency, which might have prevented award of a contract.
Under Phase I, TACOM awarded 3 contracts for the integration of the respective contractors HMMWV Repower Kit into a HMMWV Recapitalized vehicle, purchased 8 each, HMMWV Repower Kits per contract (this was broken down in one kit integrated into a HMMWV Recapped vehicle and 7 kits installed at Letterkenny Army Depot), acquired Field Service Representative support during installation of the kits, and acquired field service test support at up to 3 Government test sites (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Yuma Proving Ground, and TACOM).
Four of the vehicles (with the furnished Repower Kits installed) were sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Maryland, and 3 of the vehicles, with the kit installed, were sent to Yuma Proving Grounds, Yuma, Arizona, for testing. The purpose of testing was to both run tests to support a Materiel Release/Type Classification Decision following award of the production contract (Phase II) and to provide data from testing for the Phase II source selection decision. Vehicles provided for this test were to be as close to production vehicles as possible. Contractors whose Phase I product differed significantly from what they proposed for production under the Phase II Evaluation would be downgraded in their assessment to the extent any untested Phase II configuration changes posed a heightened risk to the Government.
As of 2005 the Marine Corps had an inventory of about 20,000 Humvees, while the Army had more than 120,000. The projected life cyle of an HMMWV at the time was 13 years, but they last no more than 2 in Iraq. The high operational tempo in Iraq led to the determination that 30 days of sustained operations there equated to a full year of operations under the conditions used to project the vehicle's initial life cycle. This meant some of the vehicles had reached an age of 13.9 years by the end of 2004.
By February 2009, the HMMWV Recapitalization program was averaging 800 vehicles converted per month. To that date, the Red River Army Depot had converted 16,745 vehicles, the Letterkenny Army Depot had converted 14,058, and the Maine Military Authority had converted 1210. The program at the time had funding through July 2009. A plan was also in place to look into converting initial up-armored HMMWVs (M1114/M1116 and similar types) to a configuration similar to the M1151.
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